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SPECIAL ISSUE
“Good without God”
Happiness and pleasure among 
the humanists 
Matthew Engelke, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
In this article, I explore conceptions of happiness and pleasure among secular humanists 
in Britain. Based on fieldwork among members of the British Humanist Association, and 
its associated local groups, I argue that happiness for the humanists is both the promise 
and demand of enlightenment, of an appeal to reason over and against what they see as 
the irrationality of religion. For them, happiness and pleasure are subjective experiences, 
but they are also indices of philosophical and ethical commitments. For the humanists, in 
short, to be happy is to be secular. 
Keywords: humanism, happiness, secularism, ethics, Britain
In 1965, a competition was held by the British Humanist Association (BHA) to 
design a logo for the humanist movement, a universal symbol to signify a commit-
ment to “non-religious people who seek to live ethical lives on the basis of reason 
and humanity.”1 Over 150 entries were received; the winning design, by a human-
ist from north London, is called “the happy human.” This symbol is now used by 
humanist organizations throughout the globe—from India to Australia to Canada. 
Members of the BHA can sometimes be found wearing lapel pins with the Happy 
Human which read “Happy Humanist” or “Good without God.” 
In 2008, the comedian Ariane Sherine launched the “Atheist Bus Campaign,” 
with the backing of the BHA and one of the association’s most prominent members, 
Richard Dawkins. The campaign was inspired by Sherine’s upset over an advertise-
ment by a Christian organization, which she saw on the side of a bus, the upshot 
1. This is how the BHA currently puts it, on the top of its homepage, www.humanism.org.
uk, accessed December 1, 2015. 
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of which was that only Jesus can save you from hell. The Atheist Bus Campaign’s 
riposte—which raised over £150,000 in support—was: “There’s probably no god. 
Now stop worrying and enjoy your life.”
In 2011, I met Andrew West, a humanist, photographer, and computer whiz; 
he did a lot of photography for the BHA and later that year went on to become the 
Association’s IT officer. Not long before joining the BHA, he completed a degree 
in photography, the thesis project for which was a series of portraits of humanists 
accompanied by their answers to the question: What are you happy about? 
In March 2014, the BHA produced a series of short animations explaining hu-
manist values and principles, narrated by the actor, comedian, and writer, Stephen 
Fry (another prominent member of the Association). One of these animations ad-
dressed the question: “How can I be happy?” The video went viral, and was viewed 
on YouTube over 750,000 times in the first several days. It was picked up by the 
Independent newspaper and dubbed, on March 25, “the best thing you’ll watch to-
day.” Shortly after the launch of the video, and this headline, I had dinner with the 
BHA’s chief executive officer. We talked a lot about the video; he was very happy. 
Happiness is part and parcel of humanism. Humanism in contemporary Britain 
is driven by a passion for the pursuit of happiness.2 But why happiness? What is it 
about happiness that stands out for humanists, and what does it entail? To answer 
these questions, we need to pay particular attention to the ways in which British 
humanists understand happiness as the struggle for, and promise of, enlighten-
ment. Humanists see themselves as children of the Enlightenment, as taking up 
the mantle of reason, the tools of science, and the potentials of free thought. Be-
ing happy and being “good without god” is a commitment both to pleasure and to 
progress.3 And for the humanists, happiness is a subjective experience—but also a 
sign of the secular. 
At least one distinguished anthropological elder, Elizabeth Colson, has warned 
the discipline off the idea of studying happiness—and, still more, any attempts to 
measure it. “Happiness,” she writes, “is in the heart and not in the eye of the behold-
er” (Colson 2012: 8). In line with the points made by Harry Walker and Iza Kavedžija 
in their introduction to this Hau collection, I find it difficult to see how measuring 
happiness could ever be anthropology’s proper remit. That doesn’t, however, mean 
that happiness should be a no-go area for anthropology—especially when the peo-
ple we study make it so central to their lives and social projects. Indeed, as Walker 
and Kavedžija note, what anthropology can contribute to happiness studies is “how 
happiness figures as an idea, mood, or motive in people’s day-to-day lives.” A small 
number of anthropologists have also recognized this, and have worked to point out 
2. “Humanism” is a term with many meanings and a long history. In this article, it means 
secular humanism. The BHA members I got to know called themselves many things, 
each of which had specific motivations and intentions. But in general, these humanists, 
secular humanists, atheists, agnostics, freethinkers, materialists, and so on, wanted to 
emphasize that they admitted no beyond, that they did not “believe” in anything super-
natural, miraculous, or divine. 
3. The 2014 World Humanist Congress, hosted by the BHA in Oxford, brought together 
over a thousand delegates from more than sixty countries. The theme was “Freedom of 
Thought and Expression: Forging a Twenty-First-Century Enlightenment.” 
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that happiness is more than a subjective experience (see, e.g., Corsín Jimenez 2008; 
Thin 2012; Jackson 2013; Fischer 2014). As Neil Thin would have it, for instance, 
“happiness is best understood not as a definable entity but as an evaluative kind of 
‘conversation’ (broadly conceived to include internal dialogues) about how well our 
lives go” (2012: 33). Thin emphasizes the “internal” aspect of such conversations, 
and in doing so highlights particular models of subjectivity, models which Colson 
is also clearly drawing upon. So perhaps in this idiom we can say that happiness 
may well be “in the heart,” as Colson puts in, but also that it is “in the head.”4 For 
the humanists I studied, happiness is very much like this; it is an idea. They have an 
ideological commitment to happiness, expressed above all as a pursuit of the good 
life.5 And for these humanists, what that means is working to articulate, and live 
out, Enlightenment values. 
The British Humanist Association 
Founded in 1896 as the Union of Ethical Societies, the BHA has existed in its current 
constitutional form since 1967. During the main period of my research (2011), the 
BHA had approximately twelve thousand members (who pay annual dues of £35) 
and another eighteen thousand supporters (who, at a minimum, receive updates 
of BHA activities via an e-newsletter). (These figures have now risen.) Based on a 
survey I conducted in June 2011 (midway through a year of fieldwork), 69 percent 
of members were male; 31 percent female. Seventy-three percent had university 
degrees, and 80 percent donated monthly or annually to charities (Oxfam, Save the 
Children, Cancer Research UK, and Amnesty International were some of the most 
common). The BHA has a number of high-profile members, many of whom are 
very active in promotion of the association. In addition to Dawkins and Fry, these 
include the scientists Jim Al-Khalili, Brian Cox, and Alice Roberts (all of whom 
have significant media careers in the United Kingdom), journalist Polly Toynbee, 
comedians Tim Minchin and Natalie Haynes, philosopher A. C. Grayling, and fic-
tion writers such as Philip Pullman and the late Terry Pratchett. The actors Patrick 
Stewart and Ricky Gervais are also distinguished supporters and so, too, is Simon 
Le Bon, frontman for Duran Duran. 
The work of the BHA can be divided into three areas. The first is the promo-
tion of humanism in policy and public debates. Much of this work is classically 
4. This idiom might not work everywhere in the world (see Throop’s and Walker’s ar-
ticles in this collection, for example), but it does roughly for such contexts as Brit-
ain and the United States (although in her brief reflections Colson extends it to 1950s 
Zambia, where she made her mark as an anthropologist). The idiom certainly works 
well enough for the British humanists I studied: such “head/heart” distinctions map 
well onto their readings of post-Enlightenment models of subjectivity. 
5. It is worth noting that the small amount of anthropological work addressing happi-
ness is often framed in relation to questions of wellbeing and pursuit of the good life 
(see, e.g, Corsín Jiménez 2008; Fischer 2014). These studies also underscore a common 
thread in the articles of this Hau collection, which is a “concern with values” (Fischer 
2014: 12, his emphasis; see also Corsín Jiménez 2008: 17–19). 
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secularist, such as campaigning for the abolition of state-funded faith schools and 
the constitutional right of Anglican bishops to sit in the House of Lords. The sec-
ond is servicing and fostering local humanist groups; there are about sixty of these, 
ranging in size from six to sixty people. This grassroots work is extremely impor-
tant to the BHA: the more locally embedded humanists are, forming communities 
of discussion, debate, and care, the better. The third main area of focus is the provi-
sion of ceremonies: weddings, naming ceremonies, and, above all, funerals for BHA 
members and anyone else who wants to have a rite of passage that is self-conscious-
ly humanist or “not religious.” Within the BHA, there is a network of approximately 
three hundred trained celebrants to provide these ceremonies throughout England 
and Wales.6 The BHA is increasingly starting to support other forms of social care, 
piloting programs in prisons and hospitals to provide humanist chaplains and oth-
er forms of pastoral support. (Not all humanists like using these terms—chaplain, 
pastoral—to describe the activities, but there is a lot of support for the initiatives, 
and the BHA itself sees no reason not to draw on the common understandings of 
such words.)
“The time to be happy is now” 
I have said that humanists see themselves as children of the Enlightenment. There 
is, of course, no way to understand the various intellectual movements and social 
changes in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and America as part of 
a single, straightforward story. And these movements and changes built on what 
came before them. For the humanists, Greek and Roman traditions of thought are 
also often embraced. Within the BHA, however, it is the language of the Enlighten-
ment that dominates, and one particular version of the Enlightenment story has 
pride of place: that in which reason snuffs out religion and gives rise to a modern 
world governed by science. Theirs is a world in which individuals “think for them-
selves,” and refuse to accept as fact or authority anything that is not based on “evi-
dence.” “With these brains we have the ability to question,” says Robin Ince, a BHA 
patron and well-known comedian; “if we fail to do that, if we look for a high priest 
or elder to do our thinking for us, to instruct us and manipulate us, then we are 
failing to live up to our potential.”7 The echoes of certain pieces of Enlightenment 
rhetoric here are unmistakable, those in which the Enlightenment serves as “the 
starting point of secular modernity and rationality” (Sorkin 2008: 1)—the “Radi-
cal Enlightenment” (Israel 2001: 11–12), for which religion cannot be rehabilitated 
and reason must be exercised. As one member reported to me, on joining the BHA, 
“Finally I found an organized voice of reason that represented my views and acts 
as a counterpoint to oppressive religion.” “Enlightenment,” wrote Immanuel Kant, 
in 1784,
6. There is a Humanist Society of Scotland, which operates independently of the BHA 
(although cooperatively). 
7. This quote is taken from the BHA’s website, in the page header; see https://humanism.
org.uk/news/, accessed December 1, 2015. The quote is one of many by prominent 
humanists that is randomly generated when loading and reloading a BHA webpage. 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (3): 69–91
73 “Good without God”
is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability 
to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in 
lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. 
Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!”—that is the motto 
of enlightenment. (1963: 3) 
It is not that all BHA members spend their days reading Kant, or John Locke, or 
David Hume. Yet the mantle of Aufklärung is held tight and proudly worn. Several 
of the BHA’s most prominent champions and contemporary inspirations—the phi-
losopher A. C. Grayling, the late critic Christopher Hitchens—have, however, read 
Kant and Locke (and others); they have charted, through their popular writings, a 
genealogy that links the humanist project to such figures. Less prominently, but no 
less importantly, the BHA coordinates the Humanist Philosophers group, which 
includes a number of well-respected academics, such as Richard Norman and Peter 
Cave. In addition to publishing on their specialist interests, and for general read-
ers too, humanists such as Norman and Cave are regularly invited to speak by lo-
cal humanist groups, where they present overviews of how humanist thought is 
linked to that of Enlightenment thinkers and those who came after them, especially 
such nineteenth-century figures as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Charles 
Darwin. In other ways, humanist scientists and science writers—Dawkins, Cox, 
Al-Khalili, and Roberts—emphasize the Enlightenment through their treatments 
of science, promotion of the scientific method, and critiques of creationism. The 
BHA’s members, supporters, and publics eagerly soak this up, through their read-
ing practices, for instance, and attendance at the BHA’s numerous annual lectures, 
named, tellingly, after Voltaire, Darwin, Bentham, and Shelley.8 These pack sold-out 
auditoriums in London, Oxford, and elsewhere. BHA staff are always giving talks—
to local groups, to trainee teachers, to trainee nurses, to school students—which 
include potted histories of humanism, illustrated by slides with quotes on reason, 
free thought, and the pursuit of happiness by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
philosophers and scientists (Hume, Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Ludwig Feuerbach). 
Among historians, none has been more insistent than Roy Porter on the fact 
that “there never was a monolithic ‘Enlightenment project’” (2000: xxi). Yet even 
so, Porter identifies some lowest common denominators of the changes that took 
place. One of them concerns the understanding of happiness. “The Enlighten-
ment’s great historical watershed,” he writes, “lay in the validation of pleasure. . . . 
The Enlightenment’s novelty lay in the legitimacy it accorded to pleasure, not as 
occasional binges, mystical transports or blue-blooded privilege, but as the routine 
entitlement of people at large to pursue the senses (not just purify the soul) and to 
seek fulfilment in this world (and not only in the next)” (ibid.: 258; 260). 
8. In the survey I conducted, 72 percent of BHA members said they had read Dawkins’ 
most well-known critique of religion, The God delusion, in which he is very explicit 
about his commitment to Enlightenment values. Asked which of three books they 
would want on a desert island, 2 percent of members chose the Bible; 62 percent chose 
the collected works of Shakespeare; and 36 percent chose Darwin’s On the origin of 
species. 
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The temporal framing of Porter’s characterization is important. There is indeed 
what we might call a “temporality of happiness,” as Walker and Kavedžija stress 
(see the introduction to this collection). In Porter’s analysis, after the Enlighten-
ment it gets increasingly premised on a shift from what we might gloss as a reli-
gious sense of time to a secular sense of time, a shift that a number of other scholars 
have written about at great length (see Anderson 1991 for one well-known exam-
ple, drawing on Walter Benjamin). The temporality of here-and-now, immanent 
being-in-this-world, is certainly central to the humanists I studied. We see hints of 
this in the Atheist Bus Campaign’s riposte to fire-and-brimstone Christianity; it is 
also expressed in the BHA’s motto: “For the one life we have.” A popular quotation 
on happiness among the humanists comes from the nineteenth-century American 
agnostic Robert Ingersoll. “Happiness is the only good,” Ingersoll said. “The time 
to be happy is now. The place to be happy is here. The way to be happy is to make 
others so” (see Jacoby 2013: 97). Like a meme, this proclamation of immanence 
and the immediate circulates among humanist communities, as, for instance, in the 
BHA’s many PowerPoint presentations dedicated to the promotion and spread of 
humanism. It is all part of the conclusion that being happy is being secular.9 To say 
“the time to be happy is now”—to stress what we do “for the one life we have”—is 
to take a very particular view of history, of human potentiality, and of the fabric 
of meaning. As another historian puts it, “Happiness, in the Enlightenment view, 
was less an ideal of godlike perfection than a self-evident truth, to be pursued and 
obtained in the here and now” (McMahon 2006: 13). “Humanists do not see that 
there is any obvious purpose to the universe, but that it is a natural phenomenon, 
with no design behind it. Meaning is not something out there, waiting to be discov-
ered, but something that we create in our own lives,” says Stephen Fry, in the BHA 
video on how to be happy. “The time to be happy is now,” he goes on to conclude. 
“And the way to find meaning in life is to get on and live it, as fully, and as well, as 
we can.”10 
Colson might eschew it altogether, but in any case no one who studies happi-
ness claims that it is easy to limn or measure. Happiness has to be seen as an ad-
mixture of sentiments, affects, demeanor, and declarations, even actions. Andrew 
9. In her history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century atheism and agnosticism in Britain, 
Susan Budd highlights this kind of view at several points. In her discussion of the 
British Secular Union, for example, founded in 1877, she cites its constitution, which 
advocates “the promotion of political, social or religious reform in any wise tending to 
increase the secular happiness of the people” (1977: 59). Readers of Budd’s history will 
see how the dynamics and arguments behind antireligious sentiment in the nineteenth 
century have many parallels with those of contemporary Britain. 
10. “How can I be happy?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tvz0mmF6NW4, accessed 
December 1, 2015. I might note here that humanists’ commitment to here-and-now 
does not preclude them from thinking of the future. Some of the humanists I got to 
know were also deeply involved in environmental campaigns and organizations, for 
instance; they certainly understood climate change as a serious challenge for human-
ity and the ecosystem (and had no patience for climate-change skeptics). Interestingly, 
however, they tended to think of these commitments separately, as if humanism and 
environmentalism had to be discrete. 
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West’s photography project, for example, which includes portraits of fifty-eight 
humanists, contains a range of concrete answers to his question: What are you 
happy about? Many of the answers are generic: “I am happy today because my kids 
have been making me laugh,” says Stephen, a philosopher in Oxford. Others are 
generic yet inflected with humanist particularities: “I’m happy to be alive, happy 
with my children and grandchildren who are the only immortality I need. I am 
happy to live in a world with food, drink, flowers and the astonishing abundance 
that flows from the imagination of other humans, dead and alive,” says Polly, a 
writer in London. (Notice Polly’s emphasis on here-and-now, on the one life we 
have.) Several of the answers include similar references to children and grand-
children, or, failing that, other pleasurable things: flowers, birds, and food. Not a 
few also reference consumption of various kinds: television shows, clothes, a new 
pair of stilettos—even the purchase of a camper van.11 Other replies are highly 
specific and tailored, humanist plugs. Says Chris, from Bournemouth: “I’m happy 
during February 2009 to have been invited to talk to North Yorkshire Humanists 
& Dorset Humanists about ‘Darwin, Science & Humanism.’ Darwin showed how 
man & all living species evolved from earlier ancestors. A supernatural creator 
is not necessary to explain any living creature’s existence on earth.” And Allison, 
from London, is happy “about spending an evening with enlightened people.” Jo-
anna, from Lansdowne, tells West she is happy because she has “no worries about 
dying.” 
West’s portraits give us an excellent range of the ways in which humanist happi-
ness can be understood. The small number of examples I’ve provided are indicative 
of the range, and we can use them to explore humanist conceptions of happiness 
yet further, in terms of both “heart” and “head,” as I put it above. Indeed, in reading 
through West’s book, and looking at the portraits, I had confirmed much of what 
I found in my own fieldwork—not only in outline, but often quite specifically. Of 
the fifty-eight humanists portrayed by Andrew in his book, twenty-four of them 
figured in my own research. 
Happiness for humanists contains both hedonic and eudaimonic components. 
When Fry says in the BHA video that we should live fully and well, he is saying we 
should combine pleasures (wine, gardening) with purposefulness (political com-
mitments, social justice). And for every humanist I met, the two had to be seen 
as of a piece. Heart and head. Another of Andrew’s photographic subjects, Harry, 
from London, sums this up perfectly in relaying the two things that make him 
happy: “making love” and “progress in moral philosophy.” 
Clearly, as we’ve seen, happiness is recognized by these humanists in the terms of 
much happiness science today, and more generally the stereotypical understanding 
11. Porter emphasizes the link between the Enlightenment and modern consumerism and 
consumption: “New lobbies of enlightened economists and progressive social com-
mentators began to argue that market culture, sport, print and leisure were economi-
cally productive entities, forces of civilization and social cohesion” (2000: 268). Today, 
of course, this is often further refined with respect to fair trade campaigns, socially 
responsible investment, and the like; see Fischer’s (2014) comparative ethnography of 
wellbeing and the good life in Guatemala (among Mayan coffee farmers) and Germany 
(among supermarket shoppers) for an example. 
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of smiles and joy. (Forty-nine out of West’s fifty-eight subjects are smiling in the 
photos, it might be noted.) The emphasis on laughing with one’s children, enjoying 
a curry, loving a new pair of high-heeled shoes, and making love is all about what 
Richard Layard calls “feeling good—enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be 
maintained” (2006: 12). 
To be happy because you don’t need any more “immortality” than that provided 
by your grandchildren, though, or because you enjoy the company of “enlightened 
people,” or because of progress in moral philosophy, or because you’re not afraid of 
dying, or because you have an opportunity to deny the existence of a supernatural 
creator (and celebrate Darwin’s birthday in the process) is not quite the same. It 
may well make you feel good, but that’s in part because you see yourself as doing 
good, as living up to your values. The happy life is, in this important respect, the 
good life. In The conquest of happiness, Bertrand Russell, one of contemporary hu-
manism’s heroes (and a committed member of the BHA-as-then for much of his 
adult life), puts it in precisely these terms: “The happy life is to an extraordinary 
extent the same as the good life” (1930: 173). And the good life is not all about 
smiles, pleasures, and joys per se. 
It’s here that humanists inject a bit more Hellenism into their Enlightenment 
sensibilities than we might find in, say, some utilitarian calculation of pleasure. For 
while the validation of pleasure is crucial to their cause—while the hedonic mat-
ters—this pleasure is, I would argue, part and parcel of a larger ethical and social 
project in which happiness gets defined through “virtuous conduct and philosophic 
reflection” (Layard 2006: 22). In short, I argue, for the humanists, the hedonic (the 
pleasurable) has to be seen as serving the eudaimonic (the good). For a humanist 
to say she loves her new high heels is not, at core, to betray her entrapment by the 
“hedonic treadmill” (ibid.: 48–49) of consumption. Or, at least, it is not only ever 
that. For what such embracement of earthly pleasures is also supposed to suggest 
is that there are only earthly pleasures to be had—that we are each our own mak-
ers. Humanists use their stilettos to beat God over the head; they use their camper 
vans to run him down in the road. They use their chances to explain why they’re 
happy to be happy here and now in a way that underscores its ethical valences. This 
is what I mean by arguing that we need to approach happiness as an ideological 
commitment. 
Chocolate and sex 
Andrew Copson is another of the humanists featured in West’s book. Andrew is the 
CEO of the BHA, and he tells us he’s happy “because the sun is shining, I have a new 
book to read and a glass of ice tea.” 
Andrew is one of the humanists I got to know particularly well through my 
research. From January to August 2011, I probably spent about twenty-five hours a 
week with him, either sitting in the corner of his office, or out and about at various 
events, meetings, and engagements. Since that time I’ve seen him regularly. I’d like 
to use Andrew as an extended example of the happy humanist, to fill out in a bit 
more detail what we’ve considered thus far, and in particular how the pleasurable 
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aspects of happiness (the hedonic) should be seen as serving the purposeful aspects 
of happiness (the eudaimonic).12 
Andrew certainly liked ice tea. And coffee and hot chocolate and cake. Not long 
before we first met, he had quit smoking and it made his sweet tooth all the worse. 
In many ways, Andrew’s delight in food, especially sweets, was indiscriminate. He’d 
just as soon have a hot cross bun from the snack trolley on an intercity train (not re-
ally very good) as an artisan brioche from the upscale coffee shop around the corner 
from his office (quite nice). But at core, Andrew actually had a very well thought-
out approach to confections. One day at the office, he was particularly happy when 
a small, nondescript package arrived. He clapped his hands and gave a little jump in 
his desk chair before opening it to reveal a box of something called Chelsea Whop-
pers. Chelsea Whoppers are chocolate-like, fudge-like strips of goodness; they’re 
also hard to find in stores, so Andrew would special order them from online retro 
candy sellers. They were pure nostalgia, a reminder of his childhood and days gone 
by. He ate the whole box that day, over the course of which I got to hear a lot about 
growing up in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Andrew grew up in Nuneaton in what he described as a very multicultural envi-
ronment. His family was not religious, but not particularly antireligious either. He 
first learned of humanism in secondary school, in a book by Barbara Smoker (a leg-
endary member of the BHA and the National Secular Society, another important 
nonreligious organization in the UK). He never gave much thought to humanists, 
though, or to religion, until he arrived at Oxford, to read classics at Balliol College. 
At Oxford, he got “very angry” at an event he attended sponsored by the Christian 
Union (at which, he mentioned to me, they were handing out free donuts). A man 
had come to speak, and 
he said that every time people heard more about the gospel, more about 
the Good News, but still refused to believe it, the more likely it was that 
they would be damned. And then later on in his talk, he sort of threw 
his arms up in frustration and said, “Oh, I don’t know why I come to 
these university events, you’re all so clever-clever, you’re never going to 
believe.” And I put my hand up and said, “Well, if you think that the 
more people learn about Christianity and refuse it, the more likely they 
are to be damned, and if you think that people will inevitably refuse it on 
[university] campuses, why are you going around deliberately making 
everyone’s damnation worse and worse and worse?”
This is classic Andrew. There were many things that came to bother him about 
religion and religious belief. And he is on the more explicit end of commitment to 
12. Copson has given his consent to be named in this section; he felt no need for anonymity, 
and, given his public profile, as well as the specificity of some of the encounters upon 
which I draw, I use his real name. In the sections to follow, though, and in line with my 
other publications on the BHA, where I draw on primary ethnographic data, I follow 
one standard anthropological convention of using pseudonyms. In almost all cases, 
however, the humanists I worked with saw no need for this. I think this has something 
to do with their commitment to a certain understanding of the scientific method and 
transparency; a humanist should have nothing to hide—not when it’s in the service of 
(social) science. 
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being an Enlightened modern. Andrew once chided me, only half-jokingly, for not 
ever having read the New Testament in Greek. He could recite Matthew Arnold’s 
poem “On Dover Beach” by heart and very well. Half way through his degree at 
Oxford, he switched to reading History. “I studied Europe up to the end of the clas-
sical period,” he told me, 
and [then] from the eighteenth century onwards, and so missed out 
completely the middle bit, where all these Christian things happened, 
and I think actually that is genuinely something that has influenced my 
view of things. . . . And although obviously I’m not thinking of Pericles 
every day, I’d be much more comfortable with the literature and culture 
of classical Athens than with church culture or whatever.
But Andrew is not a “new atheist” humanist; he is not as pugnacious as some. He has 
worked closely with various bodies on faith-based issues, and serves on the board 
of the Religious Education Council of England and Wales. (Andrew is a strong 
supporter of religious education in the national curriculum—and of humanism 
being included in it.) And for him, the BHA’s provision of ceremonies is absolutely 
crucial to a humanist future. It was Andrew who pushed for (and engineered) the 
expansion of humanist networks of care into the realms of chaplaincy and pastoral 
support in hospital, prisons, and the military services. These kinds of community 
provision are central to his understandings of happiness, wellbeing, and a good life. 
One area where Andrew could get indignant, though—where he could get 
annoyed in the manner of the new atheists—was when the pleasures and joys of 
this life came under attack. Sometimes the indignation played out sarcastically. In 
January 2015, he appeared on the BBC’s Sunday morning discussion show, The 
big questions, to discuss the government’s recent decision not to give legal recogni-
tion to humanist weddings in England and Wales.13 (Andrew is regularly on televi-
sion and the radio, representing a humanist or “nonreligious” point of view.) Taiwo 
Adewuyi, a conservative Christian and the founder of “Discuss Jesus,” was also 
on the show; in explaining why he opposed humanist marriages, Adewuyi said 
that “humanism is . . . a first-class ticket to the very hypersexualized culture that 
we’re seeing.” Andrew, with an incredulous smile on his face, began his reply by 
saying, “Well, if you’re going to go to wantonness and debauchery, I suppose you 
might as well travel first class.”14 Another time, in 2012, we were together, speaking 
to a prominent conservative evangelical Christian after an event. He and Andrew 
knew each other relatively well (the public square isn’t that big), and the three of us 
were engaged in polite small talk. Somehow the conversation turned to marriage, 
at which point Andrew said, “Isn’t it strange how evangelical Christians spend so 
much time telling their children that sex is horrible and disgusting and sinful and 
13. Humanist weddings are legal in Scotland; in England and Wales, BHA celebrants do 
conduct weddings, but the couple have to have a ceremony at the local Registry Office 
as well in order to be legally married. The BHA’s lobbying in Parliament came very 
close to success, but faced strong opposition from the Anglican Church and others who 
opposed the move. 
14. BBC One, The big questions, “Should humanists have equal rights to religions?” avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3j8jQkSydeo, accessed December 1, 2015. 
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yet, at the same time, that they should save it for the person they marry?” As with 
what we see in some of West’s portraits, the barbs and jibes have an ethical valence 
here, all the more so when they pertain to the pleasures that people might rightly 
enjoy as human beings with one life to live. This isn’t about hedonism for hedo-
nism’s sake: this is about being good without God.
It is important to stress that Andrew didn’t spend all his time eating Chelsea 
Whoppers, or mocking evangelical Christians about their attitudes to sex. I have 
only given a focused account of his character and commitments as relevant to the 
themes of this article. I got to know Andrew as a serious, committed campaigner 
for the causes he believes in: equality in state school admissions policies; dignity for 
those suffering with a terminal illness (the BHA strongly supports legislation on 
assisted dying); the importance of teaching humanism in the school curriculum; 
campaigning for humanist weddings; and free speech and its safe exercise (both in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere; the murder of three atheist bloggers in Ban-
gladesh has been a recent major concern). But chocolate and sex, and the happiness 
they bring, are an important part of the overall picture of being good without God. 
Religion, reason, and emotion 
The critique of religion and the cultivation of humanism go hand in hand. Within 
the BHA, religion is humanism’s opposite and other; religion is, for many of these 
humanists, inimical to reason and the kind of flourishing they value.15 We have 
already had a sense of this. In some cases, humanist happiness is defined in op-
position to religious misery, worry, suffering, or delusion. This is where the com-
mitment to a radical version of the Enlightenment becomes especially relevant. 
Christianity, in particular, is, as we’ve seen, heavily criticized. It is not unusual to 
see BHA members, or those in affiliated local groups, turn sour at the thought 
of Christian approaches to life, approaches which many of them understand as 
dominated by a fixation with and even embracement of suffering, asceticism, and 
self-denial. There is no equivalent of theodicy in the BHA’s articulation of human-
ism. Claims that someone’s cancer or a flood or other personal or social misfortune 
is “God’s will,” or, even less nefariously, “telling us something,” drive them mad. 
Religious mores get cast as tools of subjection and shaming, or called out as hypo-
critical, as with Andrew’s comment to the evangelical back in 2012. More gener-
ally, humanists often express dismay and sometimes disgust at the thought that the 
master sign of Christianity is not a happy human but a suffering man. How, they 
ask, could any community orient themselves by a crucifix?
15. While I have been writing here about members of the BHA, the attitudes, dispositions, 
and commitments we’ve found are not unique to them. Indeed, while there are some 
notable differences with the American context (in terms of organization, and, in par-
ticular, the scale of provision of nonreligious ceremonies), humanist and atheist groups 
there often define themselves in explicit opposition to religion, as defenders of reason, 
and as committed to a similar understanding of happiness; see the work of Jesse M. 
Smith (2013) for one qualitative, sociological case study. 
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The point here is that religion, in this humanist view, is inimical to happiness—
true happiness, that is: a eudaimonic happiness grounded in the good (secular) life. 
There are equal measures of opprobrium, then, for Christians and other believers 
who don’t dwell on the crucifixion or suffering. The stereotyped “happy-clappy” 
Christian is considered just as problematic as what some BHA members would 
gloss as the guilt-laden, crucifix-wearing Catholic. For some, such believers are 
seen to be not happy so much as deluded into thinking they are happy, or at least 
are only superficially happy, because their worldviews cannot allow for the good 
life as humanists conceive of it. For others, this expression of faith is assumed to be 
a façade. Even humanists who do accept some of the academic research suggesting 
that religious people are happier (e.g., Stavrova, Fetchenhauer, and Schlösser 2013) 
argue that the “religion bit” is secondary: if these people are happy, it is because of 
the human community they share, not its metaphysical aeration.16 As BHA mem-
bers regularly told me, there are clearly benefits to voluntary associations: this is 
why local groups are such an important part in the BHA’s work. Increasingly, local 
groups are doing the kinds of things that religious groups have traditionally done: 
calling on elderly members in their homes for social visits; volunteering for local 
charities and programs; participating in community fairs and civic life; even, in 
some cases, forming choirs and other corporate activities, such as parkland walk-
ing clubs (during which, in some of the more well-developed cases, botanists or 
geologists might be invited along to explain the local flora, fauna, and landscape). It 
is this, they said, that fosters happiness and well-being. God has nothing to do with 
it. (We might compare the similarities and differences with Ethiopian Pentecostal 
“techniques of happiness” discussed by Dena Freeman, in her article for this collec-
tion.) Alongside such arguments, humanists also often point to levels of happiness 
and well-being in Scandinavian nations, which are regularly referred to as the “least 
religious” in the world.17
Another problem with religion, when it comes to the realization of this particu-
lar good life, is its disregard for “evidence.” This is part of what I mean by saying 
16. See also Amy C. Wilkins’ (2008) qualitative study of the way in which a particular evan-
gelical Christian group in the United States worked to foster happiness and a happy 
demeanor among its members; what she shows so well is how happiness is not neces-
sarily epiphenomenal, but a normative demand. In this group, at least, “one cannot be 
a real Christian and not be happy” (ibid.: 294, emphasis in original). One point to keep 
in mind, then, is how happiness can become a demand of authenticity within certain 
communities of practice. Wherever we find that happiness has an ethical valence, then, 
it can present something of a catch-22: be happy, or else. 
17. The sociologist Phil Zuckerman (2008) has written about these issues in his informative 
study of Denmark and Sweden. Zuckerman’s work is largely qualitative, but he points to 
quantitative research as well, including that of Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basáñez, and 
Alejandro Menéndez Moreno (1998), to support the argument that there is no neces-
sary correlation between religiosity and happiness. Notably, too, Zuckerman’s qualita-
tive work (see 2008: 57–75) picks up on Scandinavian attitudes toward death, and a 
strong sense in which the finality of death means that we should seek pleasures and 
progress in, and for, this world—very much akin to what we find in the BHA’s invoca-
tions of Ingersoll’s saying “the time to be happy is now.” 
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that in this humanist project, “true happiness” can’t be realized except in secular 
form. Religion frustrates eudaimonia. For these humanists, evidence is a precondi-
tion for eudaimonia, because the good life can only be lived with due regard for 
science. And “evidence” does mean scientific evidence: objective, verifiable, and 
replicable. Evidence means knowledge rather than belief: fact rather than feeling. If 
immortality or the supernatural could be “proved” in the same way as the value of 
the antioxidants in blueberries, then humanists would alter their positions. Striv-
ing after truth in such terms, according to strict and well-defined evidentiary pro-
tocols, is a central aspect of humanist virtue. “I care passionately about the truth 
because it is a beautiful thing and enables us to lead a better life,” says Dawkins, in 
a promotional statement on the BHA’s homepage.18 As one member told me, she 
joined the BHA “to work towards a more rational society.” “I had to do something,” 
said another woman. “I had to understand more about religion and how to make 
Britain a secular society . . . the BHA[’s] values are my values.” 
Logic is another key element here, and was often used by humanists I met to 
explain why they weren’t religious, and why religion itself is a dead end. They are 
simply not willing to accept that the Son of God, for instance, can defy the laws 
of nature. As one BHA staffer told me, his mildly active Anglicanism started to 
unravel from the age of twelve, when he realized that what his Religious Education 
teacher at school was saying simply wasn’t plausible. He began looking up things in 
the family encyclopedia—archaeological records, geological records. “I think you’ll 
find this with a lot of atheists,” he told me. “It’s the little things that get you into it 
[investigating religious claims], because, if there’s no evidence . . . a lot falls down 
in Christianity.” 
 The dangers of emotionalism are also regularly emphasized. For humanists, a 
“happy-clappy” Christian is, in this sense, more prone to deny reality and common 
sense. Edward, who ran a local group in London, gave me an example. For a time he 
worked at a software company, and one of the women he worked with was a Born-
Again Christian. Edward once asked her whether, if her church suggested as much, 
she would say white is black and black is white. When she suggested she would—if 
that’s what her pastor told her—he concluded that further discussion was point-
less. This Christian, he told me, was letting subjective relationships upend reality. 
“An awful lot of religious people are in that situation,” he said. “Having emotional 
reasons for accepting anything.” Among humanists, the first reaction to anything, 
or the first articulation of a position or a view, was normally made in relation to the 
primacy of reason and a skepticism toward and wariness of emotion. 
Yet the humanist commitment to happiness makes it clear that emotion and sen-
timent are not necessarily antithetical to reason, or a humanist vision of the world. 
Secular humanism has often come up against versions of this claim—that it drains 
the passions, or, in a related set of arguments, “disenchants” the world. Indeed, the 
extent to which secular humanism has been cast as a bloodless, passionless render-
ing of modernity has even prompted one academic and secular humanist to make a 
18. It is important not to overstate Dawkins’ seeming dourness; while it doesn’t get picked 
up on nearly as often, most of his work—not least his recent memoir (Dawkins 2013)—
is threaded through with appreciations of beauty, wonder, and enjoyment: the thrill of 
science and the majesty of nature. 
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case for “the joy of secularism” (Levine 2011). A new grouping of popular human-
ist authors has emerged as well, including a chaplain at Harvard University whose 
book Good without God: What a billion nonreligious people do believe is much more 
focused on the cultivation of community, joy, and happiness as both a pleasure and 
a purpose (Epstein 2009).19 
Certainly, within the BHA, Max Weber’s key indices of disenchantment—ra-
tionalization, calculation, and intellectualization (Weber 1946: 139–40)—are not 
uncritically lauded. To be sure, humanists do not go in for what Weber called the 
“intellectual sacrifice” (ibid.: 156) of the believer; this is, as we have seen, precisely 
what they want to end. It’s what Edward understood his colleague to be admit-
ting—deferring, as Ince puts it, to what the high priest or elder says. Yet “thinking 
for yourself ” and “daring to know” do not demand the surrender of the emotional 
or, even, certain understandings of wonder. In the funerals that BHA celebrants 
conducted, for instance, or in local group activities and discussions, I often found 
strong appeals to, and endorsements of, emotion and sentiment. BHA celebrants 
are a small yet important grouping of association members who consciously stop 
short of the lauding of reason that often marks, or is seen to mark, the secular-
humanist disposition. BHA funeral officiants are called “celebrants” for a reason.20 
A BHA funeral is supposed to “celebrate” the life of the deceased. It is not that 
sadness and mournfulness are denied or discouraged; of course, humanist funer-
als can be gut wrenching for family and friends. But BHA funerals are often joyful 
and irreverent in ways which, for the celebrants at least, are part of their ethical 
and ideological commitments to “the one life we have.” Within the funeral industry 
more generally, there is increasing talk of “the happy funeral,” which is juxtaposed 
to the “solemn” nature of the traditional church counterpart.21 These days, jocu-
lar and ironic Monty Python and Frank Sinatra tunes are more likely to be heard 
than Anglican hymns or live organ music. BHA celebrants see themselves at the 
vanguard of this shift, of helping effect a more general transformation away from 
suffering, sin, and the horizon of happiness being set in an afterlife.
All the same, celebrants had concerns about emotionalism and, because of it, 
the dangers of irrationality. One of the most common was with respect to what I’ve 
called “the coffin question” (see Engelke 2015): many celebrants saw the presence 
of the coffin at the funeral as a potential rent in the immanent order, an object that 
could be imbued by the mourners with an agency or animate presence, and prompt 
emotional breakdowns (the figure of the widow who refuses to let go of the cof-
fin, drowning in tears). Even among the celebrants, then, the ultimate ordering of 
things was usually clear. Sentiment should be the servant of reason. 
19. See Paul Dolan (2014) for a popular recent argument on the need to understand happi-
ness in relation both to “pleasure and purpose.” 
20. I did know one celebrant who wouldn’t use the label. He insisted on “officiant.” As he 
put it to me: “I’m not going to use ‘celebrant’ when I phone up a father whose eight-
year-old child’s just been killed in a car crash and say, ‘Hey, we’re here to celebrate her 
life.’ I’m not going to say that.”
21. See “Happy funerals: a celebration of life?” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/maga-
zine-31940529, accessed December 1, 2015. 
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It is in the course of explicitly ethical deliberations that the links between hap-
piness, sentiment, and reason can be seen to matter most. Let me illustrate this by 
turning to an extended example of a collective exercise in which a group of human-
ists saw themselves as instantiating their commitment to being good without God. 
Gran’s cat 
When I met Edward—the man who couldn’t believe his Born-Again Christian col-
league’s “emotional reasons for accepting anything”—he ran the Green Vale Hu-
manists and Secularists out of a Friends House (Quaker meeting house) on a pleas-
ant, late-Victorian side street in London. Green Vale was not a large local group; it 
only had about a dozen regular attendees. In Edward, though, they had an enthu-
siastic and committed chair. He would organize not only the twice-monthly meet-
ings (one at the Friends House for a semiformal discussion with a guest speaker; 
the other, less formal, for socializing at a pub), but also occasional trips into central 
London to see a prominent humanist speak at Conway Hall or a university. In the 
spring, he would organize bluebell walks through a local nature preserve, followed 
by a pub lunch. Socializing was important to him, and when I last saw him, in July 
2014, just as he was in the process of stepping down as chair of the group (in antici-
pation of a move abroad), he lamented that if he had had more time, he would have 
worked on building up “practical involvement in the community,” visiting more 
local schools, for instance, and ramping up a mentoring program with which the 
group had become involved at the nearby prison. 
Edward’s primary passion as a humanist was for developing what he called 
“secular morality.” He summed this up in three imperatives: be honest with your-
self; be kind; be courageous. When I asked him what makes a morality secular, he 
said: “Self-honesty, because it is incompatible with religion.” But self-honesty is 
not a term he liked; it involves integrity and courage, as well as self-esteem. “It is 
a source of frustration to me that there is no English word meaning self-honesty,” 
he wrote to me, in an e-mail, when reading a draft of this article. “So far I have 
not been able to find one in any other language and can’t help thinking it could be 
because our species would rather avoid the subject. If you find such a word in any 
language, please let me know.” Back when we conducted an informal interview, in 
summer 2014, he said: “I see virtually all religious people as compromising their 
integrity, their honesty. They’re desperate for comfort. If you’re not being honest 
with yourself, you’re not living your own life—you’re living someone else’s.” Sapere 
aude! 
Ethics and morality were a major focus of all local groups.22 At Green Vale, they 
were even more so than usual. This was partly down to the fact that Edward staged 
a series of “ethical juries” at the monthly meetings at the Friends House. Between 
22. As with reason and rationality, most of the humanists I knew used these terms—ethics 
and morality—interchangeably. For a discussion of how anthropologists can approach 
this issue, see Lambek (2010: 9); following Lambek (and others), I opt for ethics over 
morality as an analytical term because of its “greater association with action than pro-
priety and with ‘the good’ than ‘the right’.” 
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2010 and 2014, Green Vale hosted five such events. Edward got the idea of running 
them from Michael Imison, a trustee of the BHA during the course of my research, 
who came from a career in television and drama (Michael was a director on an 
early series of Doctor Who). Michael is someone who had also been involved in 
the Society for the Furtherance of Critical Philosophy (SFCP), which recognizes in 
particular the importance of Immanuel Kant’s work. One of the core activities of 
the SFCP is to facilitate “Socratic dialogues,” a key aim of which is to help “people 
develop capacity to live as independently-thinking rational ethical agents.”23 
I attended an ethical jury at Green Vale in September 2012. It was a Thursday 
evening and people were slowly arriving at the Friends House. The rented room 
was small and looked out onto a garden; it was painted that shade of green that 
only churches and schools seem to have to suffer. We gathered in a circle of chairs 
around the evening’s facilitator, Ralph, who was visiting from elsewhere in the 
greater London area, and who had experience of running ethical juries. James, the 
local group treasurer, was chairing the evening in Edward’s absence. In addition to 
the facilitator, treasurer, and me, four women and eight men attended. This includ-
ed a woman who was a member of the Friends House, and a Sikh man (who self-
identified as such, and was wearing a turban). Another was Mark, a young man in 
his early twenties from a university on England’s southern coast. He was involved 
in the national-level governance of student atheist, humanist, and secularist groups 
and, like me, wanted to learn more about ethical juries. Mark hoped to conduct an 
ethical jury back at his university.
As the group came to attention, one of the men asked Ralph: “What do you 
mean by ethical? It’s so misused that word.” Ralph paused for a moment before re-
plying: “I can tell you an answer off the top of my head,” he said, “but it’s up to you.” 
With no greater steer, Ralph moved on by welcoming everyone, and then putting 
up a PowerPoint slide. He also had a flip chart, which would see much use over the 
course of the evening. The PowerPoint read: 
•	 Ethical Juries: original idea 
•	 Gather jury 
•	 Select dilemma from personal experience 
•	 Discuss – protect your example giver
•	 Use Golden Rule, Least Harm 
•	 Vote 
After expanding on these points briefly (including the basics on different moral 
philosophies), Ralph asked us to offer up some possible dilemmas. “It’s definitely 
best to have personal dilemmas,” James said, “so someone can share all the details.” 
James offered one about a relative’s relative who needed bail for a sex trafficking of-
fense. One of the women wanted to discuss relativism, but she didn’t have a specific 
dilemma in mind. Mark offered another possibility: his grandmother has asthma 
and it’s starting to take its toll, and she has a cat, which makes it worse. How much 
should her children and grandchildren intervene? In a scattershot way, two more 
potential cases emerged: a friend of a member who is committing adultery; and, 
even less personally, the public apology that day by a national-level politician over 
23. See http://www.sfcp.org.uk/education/, accessed December 1, 2015.
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his party’s broken campaign promise. But the facilitator, who offered up this last 
example, was also wary of it: “How can we discuss this as a moral question without 
getting sucked into ‘yah-boo’ politics?” 
With this mix of choices on the table, all scribbled up on the flipchart, the fa-
cilitator asked us to decide on one. Nine people wanted to discuss the cat; three 
voted to discuss the politician’s apology; and one—the woman who mentioned it—
wanted to discuss relativism. So we went with Gran’s cat. Ralph asked Mark for all 
the “key features” of the situation. 
Gran is eighty-four and of sound mind. She is a widow and has been for 
some time. Mark’s mother is her daughter. Mark suffers from asthma and it 
runs in the family. His gran has always had cats. Someone asks if she’s always 
had breathing difficulties; no, Mark says, and she has only been diagnosed 
with asthma in the last year. She has always been very active: loves bowling 
and badminton. “I would say she’s irrational about the cat,” Mark says. “I 
would never tell her this. But I’d like her to rehome the cat.” Gran also has 
low hemoglobin and an arthritic hip, so her condition is not all down to the 
asthma and the cat. “She has been living life as an elderly person very, very 
well. Not too long ago she went to China for three weeks.” Mark asks us if we 
need any more facts. Everyone is satisfied for the moment. 
“We need to pinpoint the moral issues,” Ralph said. One of them is intervening. But 
what is intervening? Do you put pressure on her to get rid of the cat? Or do you just 
say something? 
“I think suggesting to the lady that she get rid of the cat is very reasonable,” 
said a man in a blue shirt. “Just saying something: I don’t see that as putting any 
pressure.” 
The facilitator wrote this up on the flip chart: 
Pressure vs. suggestion
Then an elderly man with glasses and a beard said: “I don’t see this as an entirely 
moral question, really. This is a health and welfare issue. The GP [doctor] can give 
her a simple choice, which isn’t moral.” 
Another elderly man said: “This is a question of trade-offs. Probably over sixty, 
you say, no, don’t change things.” He goes on to tell us he had a friend who died re-
cently, aged seventy, from lots of drinking and smoking. But he wouldn’t have told 
him to stop; he was too old. “And the pleasure was worth it.” It would have been 
doing more harm than good. 
“If you were to remove the cat, the loneliness would do more harm,” said the 
Sikh man.
“The GP has to tell her she has a choice,” said the elderly man with glasses and 
a beard, again. “Live with the cat and accept the consequences; or get rid of the cat, 
live longer but perhaps less happily.” 
The woman interested in relativism, who was a nurse, raised the possibility of 
Mark kidnapping the cat. Then she went on to tell us about the health issues and 
dilemmas she’s seen with religious people who refuse treatment, before coming 
around to Mark’s gran. “But it’s her choice!” she ended by saying. 
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Ralph tried to focus us. “What are the moral principles? I’m not seeing these 
here.” 
At this point, Mark added that one of the considerations had to be that his gran 
is of sound mind; she has her faculties. The bearded man, seeming to pick up on the 
nurse’s earlier question, wondered what would happen if the cat just “disappeared.” 
“I think this is more your problem than your gran’s,” the Quaker woman 
suggested. 
“That’s true in a way, yes,” admitted Mark. She’s the only grandparent he has left, 
though, and he doesn’t want to lose her. 
Ralph wondered: “Is the cat issue more a diversion from the issue of how Gran 
will look after herself as she gets older?” 
Mark didn’t really focus on Ralph’s question. He went on to tell us his family had 
the opposite scenario with his paternal grandfather, who was of sound body but not 
sound mind. 
“As a nurse,” the nurse offered at that point, “I think that after a few months, she 
would feel better.” 
There was some shuffling in the seats at this suggestion; not everyone agreed. 
“The most moral solution to the problem is to leave her alone,” said the bearded 
man, definitively. 
“Yes,” replied Mark. “And we’re [Mark’s family] very much on the ‘suggestion’ 
end [of the facilitator’s spectrum]. But she says she’s getting depressed about being 
old.” 
James came in at this point to suggest that at issue are three ethical principles 
(respect for autonomy; honesty; concern for welfare) and two “skills” (judgment; 
diplomacy). Ralph said there’s another “moral principle”: frankness. 
“It’s all based on quality of life,” said a man who had been quiet to that point. 
“As she’s of sound mind, you have to respect that,” said the bearded man. 
“Well, any suggestion is pressure,” said the nurse. “What for someone is a sug-
gestion is pressure to someone else.” 
“That’s where diplomacy comes in,” Ralph offered. 
“There’s a least-harm-thing end, as well,” said Mark, referencing Ralph’s flip 
chart, which by this point was littered with scribbles, Venn diagrams, and vari-
ous connecting lines, including a split between the “social/psychological” issues 
involved and the “physical” ones. Pointing to them, Mark said the social/psycho-
logical side and the physical side couldn’t be neatly separated. 
Ralph started to wrap things up. “How have you experienced this discussion?” 
he asked Mark. 
“I think everyone [relates to] the issue of getting old,” Mark said, “because this is 
very emotionally charged. I haven’t heard anything that suggests I should be more 
interventionist. But I didn’t think I would. But I feel happy to have been affirmed. 
And I can look back on this in years and not feel guilty, feel I’ve approached it in 
the right way.” 
We didn’t formally vote after this, but it was clear that the group wasn’t suggest-
ing a radical course of action. Given how this only confirmed Mark’s view, there 
was not much further ado. Just as we were about to break up, though, and share 
some biscuits, the bearded man with glasses said he brought up the GP because it’s 
a GP’s job to interfere. A woman in a floral-patterned shirt, who had been totally 
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quiet to that point, jumped in quickly: “And he’s objective!” Mark admitted he nev-
er would have thought of the GP as relevant (he also didn’t say if the GP was a man 
or a woman); surely it was up to the family. And with that we did get to the biscuits, 
small talk, and our journeys home. 
As with events I observed at other local groups, the ethical jury at Green Vale 
circled around the exercise of reason, here in the pursuit of happiness. The di-
lemma posed by Gran’s cat involved the issue of responsibility—but also balance, 
and discerning motivations. What must one do for others, and how can such action 
be recognized? Was this about Mark’s happiness, or his grandmother’s? How can 
her pleasure, in spite of its costs, be differentiated from Mark’s pain? Turning the 
matter over to the doctor—making it a scientific rather than a social issue—was, 
clearly, a nonstarter for most participants, yet not all of them, and it kept recurring 
until the very end of the session. I was struck by the after-the-fact contribution by 
the woman in the floral-patterned shirt. It was as if she had to say it—she had to 
point to what she perceived as a doctor’s objectivity. Objectivity really does matter 
to humanists; where it is perceived, it must be pursued. 
For most of the participants, though, such objectivity was, in this instance, not 
relevant to the discussion. Without it, what mattered most was Mark’s gran’s ability 
to decide for herself. The fact that Mark emphasized his gran was of “sound mind” 
was crucial to the deliberation. Guided by their own compasses of reason, those 
gathered had to respect her freedom of choice. Despite Mark’s concern that she 
was being “irrational,” the group—and even Mark, I would argue—recognized that 
rationality and reason are, in some instances, not the final appeal—“Because this is 
very emotionally charged,” as Mark said. The cat made Gran happy. That was what 
mattered in the end. She was getting increasingly depressed about being old, Mark 
told us, but the cat was clearly a source of comfort, despite any extent to which it 
might have been exacerbating her physical condition. 
Conclusion 
In August 2014, almost two years after this ethical jury, I spoke to Mark on the 
phone. “Things are much the same,” he told me. Gran still had the cat. “There’s 
unlikely to be, to my mind, any resolution. The cat will likely outlive Grandma, 
and the cat gives her a lot of comfort.” Mark’s love for his grandmother struck me 
as irrepressible. I was surprised by the course of our phone call. This is not some-
one I got to know in my research; we only met at the ethical jury and I called him 
out of the blue. Within a minute of being on the phone, though, Mark was filling 
me in on his grandmother’s continuing verve for life, and her independence. Not 
long before, he explained, Grandma had prepared a big dinner at her house, much 
to Mark’s mother’s dismay; Grandma had only recently returned from a spell in 
hospital. (And it was always Grandma or Gran with Mark; he never used the pos-
sessive to differentiate her identity.) And then there was her plan to go to Vietnam, 
at the start of 2014. This was “kiboshed” by Mark’s mother, Mark said, much to 
Grandma’s frustration. 
Had the ethical jury been helpful? It had, he said. In line with what he said at the 
jury, it was mostly about confirming his sense of things—about knowing he had 
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reached his decision in the right way. Yet the perspectives of others really helped. 
“I got the inkling that I was undervaluing the comfort this creature was providing 
to Grandma. It was well meaning [to think of getting rid of the cat] but perhaps 
unfounded. . . . The opinions that people give [in ethical juries] are fairly well in-
formed, and I appreciated how these should be taken seriously.” He was apprecia-
tive of the reasoned deliberation. “It’s a funny situation to be in a group where [rea-
son] guides discussion so strongly,” he said, but very valuable. Reason, he said, is 
“an overarching principle. It definitely does guide conversation. But I think there’s a 
self-awareness of it being an unobtainable goal. Part of the human condition is that 
we want to be reasonable and rational. But we’re not.” 
In his masterly book on Britain and the Enlightenment, Roy Porter has occasion 
to cite a saturnine remark of William Hazlitt’s: “Reason, with most people, means 
their own opinion” (in 2000: xxiii). Hazlitt is another of the humanists’ predeces-
sors and inspirations (he is the subject of a recent biography by A.  C. Grayling 
[2013]), someone for whom reason is not one’s own opinion. Not entirely. 
It is in the tension between the objective and the subjective understandings of 
reason, and how this relates to happiness as both a pleasure and a purpose, heart 
and head, that we find Britain’s humanists today—people like Mark, for whom 
“true” reason is an overarching principle, yet one we can never live up to. Mark 
was “happy,” he told the group at Green Vale, to have been confirmed in his think-
ing. The issue here, though, wasn’t about living up to some categorical impera-
tive (à la Kant). Nor was it a straightforward utilitarian calculus (à la Bentham). 
Humanist ethics are, in the terms of moral philosophy, a virtue ethics, what James 
Laidlaw has recently described, after Alasdair McIntyre, as “the pursuit of ideals 
through socially instituted and habituated practices, the importance of narrative 
understanding and reasoning, and the idea of ethical traditions being constituted 
in part through ongoing argument” (2014: 79). As one of the BHA’s trustees once 
put it to me, reason “applies when you would have a serious decision to make 
about how to do something, more than what to do.”24 Mark was happy to be con-
firmed in what he did (or didn’t do) about his gran and her cat, but the process of 
deliberation itself, of judgment, was equally central to the character and quality of 
his happiness. 
In Man a machine, a mid-eighteenth-century text that was scandalous even 
by radical Enlightenment standards (see Israel 2001: 704–9), Julien Offray de la 
Mettrie offered a withering attack on metaphysics and the soul, on the existence of 
anything beyond the material and here-and-now. His work was offered in praise 
of science—and of pleasure. “The world will never be happy until it is atheist,” he 
wrote. In such a world, “deaf to all other voices, tranquil mortals would follow only 
their own spontaneous inner council . . . the only one that can guide us to happiness 
along the happy paths of virtue” (cited in McMahon 2006: 227). 
According to Darrin McMahon, such talk of virtue—and the classically inspired 
understandings of reason that accompanied it—is misleading in La Mettrie. Virtue 
24. See also Lambek’s (2010: 19–25) discussion of Aristotelian virtues, in which “a practice 
is ethical insofar as the goal is not instrumental but reaching for excellence within the 
particular practice—and for human good or happiness overall in the practice of prac-
tices” (ibid.: 21). This is precisely what was at stake in the deliberation on Gran’s cat. 
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was vice: he was a hedonist for hedonism’s sake. In his extremism, indeed, he was 
“snipping the suture that had held Western intellectual life together since the time 
of Socrates: the link between virtue and happiness; the link between happiness, 
reason, and truth” (ibid.: 229). 
Humanists in Britain might well cheer at La Mettrie’s remark: being good with-
out God is, in the final analysis, for them, the only authentic option. The world will 
never be happy until it is atheist. But humanists are not snipping at the suture of 
Western intellectual life. As I have tried to show throughout this article, they work 
to reinforce the link between virtue and happiness—to make happiness about the 
heart, but also the head. Socrates still matters in their view, alongside the watershed 
validation of pleasure. 
Maybe we could say humanists want to have their cake and eat it too—or their 
Chelsea Whoppers, as the case may be. Pleasure is part and parcel of the humanist 
vision of the world; it is something we deserve to have. But pleasure for human-
ists comes not solely in the act of consumption or consummation, for any such act 
must be seen as part of an overarching commitment to the idea of happiness, to 
what it means to be good without God—to strive for the values of Enlightenment 
and “the one life we have.” 
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“Good without God”: Bonheur et plaisir parmi les humanistes.
Résumé : Dans cet article, j’explore les conceptions du bonheur et du plaisir des 
humanistes laïques de Grande-Bretagne. En m’appuyant sur un travail de terrain 
mené auprès de la British Humanist Association et les groupes qui y sont associés à 
l’échelle locale, je suggère que le bonheur est pour les humanistes la promesse et la 
condition d’un développement humaniste, d’une orientation vers la raison capable 
de se détourner et de vaincre l’irrationalité du fait religieux. Bonheur et plaisir sont 
pour eux des expériences subjectives, mais aussi des indicateurs d’un engagement 
philosophique et éthique. Pour les humanistes, en bref, être heureux, c’est être laïc. 
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